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INTRODUCTION 
The development* economics literature emphasizes the role of" 
money and credit in a way significantly different from that of 
the developed countries. The most important difference, it is 
argued, arises due to the operation of the transmission 
mechanism between the real and financial sectors of these 
economies. The financial sector or to be more specific the 
organized part of the financial sector (which is the most 
important part of the financial sector in an LDC like that of 
India] is directly or indirectly controlled by the Government 
directly through the operation of the public sector banks and 
non-banking financial institutions and indirectly through 
Central Bank's different legislations. The most important policy 
of the Central Bank that affects the financial sector is that the 
deposit as well as the lending rates in these economies are 
completely administered. As a result, rate of interest can no 
more be considered as the adjustment variable to equilibrate 
demand for loans with the supply of loans. Then there is either 
excess demand for credit or excess supply [see for example. 
Blinder (1987), Blinder and Stiglitz (1983), Rakshit [(1982), 
(1987), (1989)], Taylor (1983)J. It is argued in these works that 
because of the very low level of the interest rate there is a 
generalized excess demand for credit. In this situation of excess 
demand for credit, it is the allocation of credit through which 
the transmission mechanism between the real and financial 
sectors operates. As far as the requirement of credit is concerned. 
T h e author is grateful to Prof. Mihir K. Rakshit. Prof. Amiya K. Bagehi. Prof. 
Dipankar Coondoo. Prof. Kunal Sengupta. Dr. Bhaswar Moitra and many 
others for their helpful comments and suggestions. However, responsibility for 
any error lies entirely with the author. 
there are two uses of credit-(i) credit requirement f o rwo r t ag 
capital and (li] credit requirement for investment in taxed 
capital- The former is o f f e n d e d the short term requirement 
of credit and the latter the tofig term requirement. 
Usually in the LDC litetature. availability-of shorit term 
loans are treated as a constraint on the total production. On the 
the hand, availability of additional credit for investment 
purpose augments the demand side (see Rakshit (1987). 
S But Investment has also an effect on the supply side 
through its etfeet on productivity. This role of term l o a n s arc 
completely ignored in the literature because of the very start 
run nature of these models. Another inadequacy o ^ e s e 
models is that in the face of constraints on either of the short 
^ f r l o n g t e r m l o a n s theproducer-investorsdonottaKe.no 
account these factors in their pricing deasions. Pnces are 
L e d on a uniform mark up over a (constant, unit prime cost 
which implies some kind of imperfection in the market arid 
excess capacity in the industrial sector. But in an imperfect y 
ompetitive framework producers do not set their profit 
maximizing prices without taking into account what otters 
(which can be captured by the average pnee level) set. On the 
other hand constraint on the availability of crcdit for investment 
purposes may be incompatible with excess capacity in the 
industrial sector. Another lacuna that needs to be dealt wrth is 
that how constraint on one type of credit affects decision making 
process of other endogenous variable (s). A concrete example is 
that if production is constrained by the availability of credit 
then it will in turn affect the demand for investment. Formally 
speaking, these models do not have the necessary micro 
foundations of incorporating imperfect competition in macro 
models without any reference to any kind of explicit or implied 
interactions between agents as well as for a particular agent 
interactions between different factors, specially in respect of 
expectation formation. 
On the other hand in the main stream literature particularly 
in the new Keynesian approach one can find the necessary micro 
foundations of macro economics incorporating imperfect 
competition (specifically monopolistic competition), but these 
are grossly inadequate as model descript for the LDCs because 
the institutional set up of these models are quite different from 
the ones that prevails in an LDC. As far as credit markets are 
concerned, credit rationing arises because of asymmetry of 
information between the lenders and the borrowers and so the 
usual adverse selection and moral hazard problems (see for 
example, Bencivenga and Smith (1993), de Mezza and Webb 
(1992). Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981)]. In this type of setting financial intermediation is an 
efficient organization which reduces the risk of a lumpy 
investment project in the sense of an assured return and easy 
liquidity to the lenders and provides credit to the producers [see 
Bernanke and Gertler (1987), Gertler (1988), Williamson 
(1987)1 ]. But in this literature no distinction is made between 
two different uses of credit mentioned earlier, viz. working 
capital loans and loans for investment [see McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) for these issues]. But one should distinguish 
between the two types of loans from the standpoint of borrowers 
as also from the standpoint of lenders in terms of liquidity 
and risk. Working capital loans are more liquid and less risky. 
In the literature of monopolistic competition and macro 
economics more emphasis is put on the explanation of nominal 
or real rigidities [see for example, Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987), Blanchard and Fischer (1989)]. Very little has been 
written about the determinants of investment in a setting of 
monopolistic competition2. Perhaps the single most exception 
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is Nishimura (1992). Nishimura considers a two-period 
framework where investment takes place in the first period 
contingent on the optimal profit function of the second period. 
It is assumed (and this is a crucial assumption) that a typical 
firm does not have perfect information about its competitors' 
investments which affect its profit when the firm determines its 
own investment. The firm forms rational expectations about 
the other firms' investment (measured by the average 
investment) on the basis of ali available information. From this 
Nishimura addresses two questions that whether imperfect 
information destabilizes investment and that increased 
competition is stabilizing under imperfect information. But the 
financial market is assumed to be perfect. This is the crucial 
departure of this paper from that of Nishimura. I consider a 
framework where either because of imperfect information 
about the borrowers or simply being administered by the 
authority the bank interest rate is not market clearing one. 
Thus there may arise credit rationing in either or both the 
periods. As a result it is possible that the optimal profit function 
of second period is a constrained one and this in turn affects 
determination of optimal level of new investment. In such a 
setting I will consider the problems of pricing and investment 
for a typical firm as also for the industry. However I will not 
address the corresponding problems in a macro set up. 
The rest of the paper is divided into three sections-
Section II will consider the basic model. Section III the effects 
of different types of shocks on the industry wide average price 
and quantity and Section IV gives a brief conclusion. 
Section II 
As I mentioned earlier the paper considers a two-period model 
where investment is undertaken in the first period and 
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production in the second period. At the end of the second period 
total capital stock is completely exhausted. Needless to mention 
this is a very simplistic approach to study investment. But this 
simplification makes the analysis simple and tractable. In this 
model all credit is financed through loans from financial 
institutions, banks for short. There is no equity capital or 
internal fund. In the first period each firm determines its own 
optimal capital stock subject to the availability of bank loans. 
The loans for fixed capital are repaid after selling the goods. 
In the second period the firms determine profit maximizing 
levels of production and prices given capital stock and the 
availability of bank loans for working capital. Working capital 
loans are also repaid after the goods are sold. But working 
capital loans are loans for one period while loans for fixed 
capital are loans for two periods. The interest rates for both 
types of loans are either administered by the financial authority 
as in the spirit of structural macro models of Rakshit and 
Taylor or the rates are fixed by the banks at some level well 
below the market clearing one because of the informational 
problems as in the neo-classical literature of Stiglitz and 
Weiss and others. It may be mentioned that the rates may be 
same or different. The availabilities of credit follow stochastic 
processes. The product market of second period is assumed to 
be monopolistically competitive with number of firms being 
exogenously given. The case for free entry implying 
determination of the number of firms can be easily extended. 
While setting optimal price in second period each firm takes 
into account what is the average price in the market. As it is not 
known with certainty one has to form an expectation about it 
and in this respect I assume that expectation about average 
price is formed on the basis of linear least squares projection 
in the spirit of rational expectations literature. 
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Now let us consider the information structure of the 
economy. In the first period each firm decides its level of 
investment, subject to the availability of (stochastic amount of) 
credit for investment purpose. I assume that the information 
about the availability of credit for investment purpose is 
known to a typical firm but being stochastic this amount may 
vary from firm to firm. This may arise because the credit is 
provided by the bank which may have, and it is generally so, 
different perceptions of risk about different firms. A typical 
firm knows the constraint that may operate on the availability 
of credit for itself but it does not know how far it deviates from 
others in the industry. In other words the firm can't distinguish 
between firm specific and industry wide components of the 
availability of first period credit. In the second period a typical 
firm has the information about the maximum working capital 
credit that it can get which has also a firm specific and industry 
wide component. But the firm can't distinguish between the 
two parts. 
Depending upon whether a typical firm's notional 
investment is constrained or whether its notional supply is 
constrained one can conceive of four cases given below. 
Case I : The firm is constrained in first period 
and not constrained in second 
period. 
Case II : The firm is not constrained in first 
period and constrained in second 
period. 
Case III : The firm is constrained in both the 
periods. 
Case IV : The firm is constrained in neither 
period. 
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I will consider first three cases only. Case IV is not 
interesting from the standpoint of interaction of credit with real 
factors. This case is same as that of Nishimura. 
First. I will spell out a typical firms decision problems in 
each period in general terms, then case by case analysis. It is 
helpful to consider the firm's decision backwards, from the 
second period to the first. Throughout this paper all variables 
are in logarithm, if not otherwise stated. Investment goods are 
taken as numeraire, so that all prices are relative ones. 
Second Period 
The demand for the firm's products in the second period is 
given by3 
q d = - m ( p - p ) - b p 
where qd = log of the demand faced by individual firm, 
p = log of the price set by individual firm, 
p = log of the average price prevailing in the 
market, 
b, m are parameters, industry wide and firm specific 
price elasticities of demand respectively. 
The form of the individual demand curve shows that 
demand for the individual firm's product depends negatively 
upon own price and positively upon prices of other firms-
products summarized by the average price. This is a 
characteristic feature of the firms operating in a monopolistically 
competitive industry. It is assumed m > b > 1; that is the slope 
of the individual demand curve is flatter than that of the 
market demand curve. 
The firm produces according to the production function 
given by 
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q = 0 1 + k 
where q = output. 
(2) 
1 = labor employed, 
k = capital employed, determined in first period 
and hence given in second period, and 
0 = parameter of the production function. 
1 assume that the parameter G satisfies 0 < 6 < m/(m-l) 
which is the second order condition for profit maximization. 
The problem of typical firm in the second period is 
max E{ p} [exp ( p ) exp ( qd ) - exp ( r ) exp (1)] (p2) 
The first three constraints are preference and technological 
constraints. The fourth is the working capital loans constraint. 
For the sake of convenience I have written it as having a 
deterministic component, lo (which is same for each firm) that 
deviates by the shock factor p (actually logarithm of the shock 
factor). The shock to availability of working capital credit p has 
two components firm specific (w) and industry wide (s). The 
firms can't distinguish between firm specific and the industry 
wide shocks, they only observe their aggregate P • r is the log of 
interest rate factor (1+interest rate). E{pj is the expectation 
operator with respect to average price, p. The firm specific as 
well as the industry wide shocks are assumed to follow normal 
distributions with Es = Ew = Esw = 0, Es2 = at and Ew2 = o2 
From the above maximization exercise one can find out the 
optimal price and output functions and thus the optimal profit 
function whether the working capital loans constraint is 
binding or not. Let the optimal profit function4 be denoted by 
n (.). Now we consider the decision problem of a typical firm in 
the first period. 
P s. t. qd 
q 
- m ( p - p ) - b p 
01 + k 
qd<q 
1 < lo+ P 
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First Period 
In the first period the firm knows the form of its profit 
function obtained from the second period. It also knows the 
cost of investment given by 
C = 2R + k = C0 + k 
where C = cost of investment, 
R = logarithm of interest rate factor (1 +interest rate) for 
term loans, exogenously given 
C0 = 2 R. 
The cost of investment function has been assumed to imply a 
constant average and marginal cost of investment. This is a 
simplifying assumption. With increasing marginal and average 
cost of investment all the results go through. 
The firm's problem in first period is to determine optimal 
investment subject to the availability of credit for investment 
purposes. It may however be noted that while determining 
optimal investment the firm does not know other firms' 
investment (and hence average investment), due to imperfect 
information problem but average investment affects a typical 
firm's profit through average productivity. Thus as in the case 
of second period the firm forms rational expectation about the 
average investment. 
Stated mathematically a typical firm's problem is 
max E{ k j [R*-1 exp (TI(. )) - exp (c)] (Pi) 
s.t. k < k0+ a . 
In this case also I have written the constraint on loans for 
investment in such a way that it has as if a deterministic 
component (k0), same for all firms and the actual one deviates 
from it by a shock factor a; a has two components—firm specific 
(u) and industry wide (d). The firm can not distinguish 
between d and u. it only observes their sum. d and u are 
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assumed to follow normal distributions with E d = E u = E du = 0. 
Var (d) = o~ , Var (u) = of. . E( £..} is the expectation operator Cl 
with respect to average investment, k and som'e other variables 
to be made precise later on. R* is the discount factor (actually 
inverse of one plus discount rate) for discounting second period 
profit function. 
Now I will consider the problem set out in general terms for 
each of the cases separately mentioned earlier. 
Case I 
Case I corresponds to the case when there is no constraint 
on working capital loans but there is constraint on loans for 
investment. In this case last constraint for the firm's problem 
(p2) becomes one of strict inequality. The first order condition 
for profit maximization gives5 
E{pj [(m- 1) exp (p + qd) - (m/9) exp (r + (qd- k)/6)] = 0 which 
after simplification becomes 
m + 6 ( l - m> p= - InG - In (1 - 1/m) + r - k/G - In E{ pj 
6 exp ((m-b) (1-1/6) p) (4) 
As I mentioned earlier the firm is assumed to form 
expectation about p rationally, based on the information set £2 
which includes the parameters of the model and the stochastic 
shocks a and (3 . Specifically, p is assumed to be. normally 
distributed with mean e( p/£2) and variance V ( p/Q) where 
e(p/H) is the linear least squares projection of p on Q and 
V( p/H)6 is the error variance. Utilizing the properties of log 
normal distribution [see Maddala (1977)1 (4) can be written as 
p = f-l [ Z - k/9 - (1/0) (m -b ) (6- 1) e( p/O)] (5) 
where f = (m + 0 (1 - m))/G 
Z = - In 6 - ln ( l - 1/m) + r - 1/2 (m-b)2 (02-l) (1/0) Vp 
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To determine e("p/n) 1 employ the method of undetermined 
coefficients as in the rational expectations literature. Every 
firm assumes that other firms form expectations about the 
average price as a linear combination of the observed values of 
a and p. say 
e( p/£>) = G + Hoc +Jp ( 6 ) 
Here, G, H, and J are the undetermined coefficients to be 
determined as in below. 
Inserting (6) in (5) and averaging over all firms, the firm gets 
p as a linear function of s and d : 
p = f"l [ Z - K / 9 - ( m - b ) (1/9) ( 9 - 1) (G + Hd+Js ) ] 
Consequently, the firms projection of p based on the information 
set Q is given by 
e(p/Q)=f _1 [Z-Tc/ 6-(m-b)(l/ G)( 9-l)(G + He(d/ D)+Je(s/ £>)] 
Here, e (d/Q) and e (s/Q) are the firm's projections of d and s 
based on its information set £2 which are linear least squares 
regressions on Q = { a, p}. Using the method of linear least 
squares regression it can be shown that7 
e(d/Q)= Aja+A2pande(s/H) = B i a + B 2 p 
Where A2 = [(1 + r^)(l + r „ ) - p 2 ] - l ( i + |_ p2) . 
A 2 = 1(1 + i j ) ( l + r^)-p2]- l ( p/rm )r^; 
B i = [(1 + 1 + rjj) - p 2 ] -lprmrp; 
B 2 = 1(1 + r p ) - p 2 ] - l ( i + j-2— p2) 
Here the following definitions were used : 
2 2 2 
r m = as / Gd • variance ratio of the industry-wide shock to the 
availability of working capital loans to that of fixed capital 
loans; 
2 2 . 2 . 
ra = a u / a d« variance ratio of the firm-specific shock to the 
availability of fixed capital loans to that of industry-wide 
shock; 
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r p = c^ / a g. variance ratio of the firm-specific shock to the 
availability of working capital loans to that of industry-wide 
shock: 
p = osd /cs Od. correlation of the industry-wide shock to the 
availability of working capital loans to that of fixed capital 
loans. 
It is evident that the correlation between s and d is an 
important determinant of the expectations. Then the firm's 
expected average price <s given by 
e(p/Q) = f - M Z - k / e - ( m - b ) ( l / 0 ) (0-'l){G + H(A i « + A 2 P ) 
+ J(Bicc+ B2p) } ] ( 7 ) 
Because all firms are identical except for aand p. and other 
firms use the same expectation formation process. (6) and (7) 
must be the same. Thus collecting terms,. 
G = f - 1 [ Z - k / e - ( m - b ) ( l / 0 ) ( 0 - 1)G] (8) 
H = f - M - ( m - b ) ( l / 0 ) (0 - lHHAi+JBj ) ] (9) 
J = f - M - ( m - b ) ( l / 0 ) (0 - l ) (HA 2 + J B 2 ) ] (10) 
Solving for G, H and J and simplifying, 
G = (0/(b + 0 ( l - b))( Z - k/0 ) 
H = 0 and J = 0. 
The rational expectations values for H and J turn out to be 
zero. This is not unexpected in view of the fact that 
projection of average price is the problem of second period and 
in this case production being not constrained by the availability 
of working capital loans, p (or a whatever may be the value-of 
p, the correlation between d and s) has no effect on the 
expectation formation of average price. Thus in this case the 
conditional expectation of the average price turns out to be 
e (p/n) = (0/(b + 0 ( l - b ) ) ( Z - k / 0 ) . (11) 
Accordingly, Vp"= 0. Substituting for e (p? Q) in (5) the optimal price charged 
by the firm is found to be 
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p = f-119 + m (1-0) ) (e + b (1-0) )-i Z - k/ e+ ( m - b ) 
( e - i ) e - i (b + e ( i - b ) )-ikj 
Taking expectation across jirms the average price is 
p — 0 7 k 
b+0 (1-b) b+0 (1-b) (12> 
putting these in (1) the typical firm's optimal output in this case 
becomes 
qd = - b0 (b + 0 (1- b) ) -l_Z + m (m + 0(1- m)) -l(k - k) + 
b (b + 0 (1-b ) )~ l k ( 1 3 ) 
Again taking expectation across firms the average output in the 
industry is given by 
qd = - b0(b + 0(1 - b) )~lZ + b (b + 0 (1 - b) H k (14) 
Putting the optimal values for individual firm's price and 
output and for average price and output the second period 
optimal profit function can be found to be 
n (k, k) = v|/ + k _ 
m + 0 (1 - m) 
m - b -
[m + 0 (1 -m) ] [b + 0 (1 -b ) ] ( 1 5 ) 
W h G r e V = " h l r + [In 0 - ln(m - l)j b + 0 ( 1 -b ) b + 0 ( 1 - b ) 
" b + 0 (1 — b) l n m + l n ( m + 9 ( 1 " m ) J 
The second period opdmal profit function has a number of 
properties. If, ceteris paribus, the firm's capital stock k increases, 
its profit increases ; whereas if the other firms' capital stock (k) 
increases, its profit decreases.8 If the firm's investment is not 
accompanied by other firms, it has a cost advantage relative to 
them in the second period. Then the firm can lower its price 
relative to others in the industry, attract more customers and 
earn more profit. By contrast, if the other firms' investment 
increases, the firm suffers from a cost disadvantage, so that its 
profit decreases. This is the way that competition among firms 
operates in the investment process. 
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As 1 mentioned earlier, in the first period the firms determine 
the optimal capital stock subject to the availability of loans tor 
fixed capital from the banks. In this case however, the availability 
of loans for fixed capital being a binding constraint, the typical 
firm's capital stock is given by 
k = kQ + a ( 1 6 ) 
Taking expectations across firms the average capital stock in 
the industry is given by 
k = kG + d ^7) 
Putting for k and k in (11) to (14) the individual and average 
prices and quantities are found to be 
0Z - k0 a 
P b + e ( l - b ) m + 6 ( l - m ) 
(m - b) (9 - 1) d (18) 
[m + 9(1 -m) ] [b + 9 (1 -b ) ] 
9Z - kn m ° a — 
P = 
b + 9 (1 - b) m + 9 (1 - m) 
9 (m - b) d 
[m + 9 (1 • -m) ] [b + 9 (1 - b)) 
9Z-k 0 d 
b + 9 (1 - b ) b + 9 (1 - b ) 




b + 9 (1 - b) b + 9 (1 - b) 
Now I will consider the complete information counterpart 
of Case I. Complete information about p and k means that 
e (p/£2) = p and e (k/H) = k and the corresponding variances, 
V (p/Q) = 0 and V (k/n) =0. Then the price and output of a 
typical firm as well as that of the industry (i. e. average price 
and output) are found to be same as in the incomplete 
information case. Thus unconditional expectation of p (as well 
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as that of q) (when Ed=Es=0) under complete information is 
same as that under incomplete information. This is because of 
the fact that though there is incomplete information about 
industry wide shock to working capital loans constraint in the 
second period and consequently average price, this does not 
affect the individual firm's price and output decisions as the 
working capital loans constraint is not binding for a typical 
firm. On the other hand, in the first period a typical firm can't 
invest in fixed capital as much as it intends to as the fixed 
capital loans constraint is binding. As a result, e (k"/Q) has no 
role to play in the individual firm's decision making process. 
These are true under all assumptions about the properties of 
the stochastic disturbances. Hence in Case I incomplete 
information and complete information give same industry wide 
average price an<3 output. A change in s has no effect on p, q 
and k while change in d reduces p and increases qfand k. 
Case II 
Case II is the exact opposite of case I. In case II the 
constraint on the availability of loans for fixed capital in first 
period is non-binding while that for working capital in second 
period is binding. Now I consider period by period analysis 
starting with the second period. 
In this case output is given by the availability of working 
capital loans. However, price charged by a typical firm in such 
a situation is not the price corresponding to the given level of 
output (given by the availability of working capital loans), 
because in deciding its price the typical firm takes into account 
the fact that availability of working capital credit for other firms 
in the industry may not be same as of itself. Thus in deciding 
its price the firm also takes into account the industry-wide 
shock to working capital credit vis-s-vis itself. 
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Availability of credit in second period is given by the last 
constraint of program (P2). Putting this in the second constraint 
of (P2) one gets the corner solution for output. Equating this 
with the left hand side of the first constraint of (P2) and taking 
expectations the firm arrives at its optimal price. Thus, 
exp (0 ( l o + P ) + k ) = E ( p } e x p l - n i ( p - p ) - b p l 
Utilizing the properties of the log normal distribution as in Case 
1 the optimal price function, given k j s ; 
p = m - M Z - e p - k + ( m - b ) e ( P / " 0 ) l 
where Z = (1/2) (m-b }2 Vp-610 . 
To obtain e (p /Q). 1 set it to be equal to linear combination 
of a and (3 as in case I. Substituting this in (22) and averaging 
over all firms 
p = m - U Z - 9s - k + (m - b) (G + Hd + Js) 1-
Taking expectations conditional on the information set a 
e (p / a ) = m-i [ Z - k + (m - b) G +(m - b) H e (d/Q) + 
{ ( m - b) J- 6} e (s/a) 1 
Substituting for e (d/«) and e (s/«) the above can be written as 
e 5 / f l ) « m - M Z - k + (m - b) G + (m - b) H [ Ai a + Aa P 1 + 
{ ( m - b) J - e } [B i a+B 2 p ] l 
Collecting terms and solving I get 
G = ( Z - k ) / b 2 
m 0 p rm r p 
9 [ (rn - b) (1 -p2 ) + m { r^ + ( t -p 2 ) } ] J <j) 
where O = b2 ( r^ + r|) + m2 r ^ r ^ b2 (1 - p2). 
The co-efficient of (3 (i.e. J) is negative because of the fact 
that the typical firm is constrained by the availability of 
working capital loans so that it can't produce at the profit 
maximizing level and is forced to charge a higher price. 
16 
Loosening the constraint will increase production. In this 
situation the typical firm expects other firms in the industry to 
face similar constraints. Hence estimate of "p depends 
negatively upon p. But though a typical firm is not constrained 
by the availability of loans for fixed capital the coefficient of a 
is not zero as one may expect. This is so because when a typical 
firm is constrained by the availability of working capital credit 
with incomplete information about the same constraint for 
other firms in the industry (i. e. incomplete information about 
s), it expects other firms to raise investment in fixed capital 
subject to the respective fixed capital loans constraint so as to 
set the prices at lower levels, attract more customers and earn 
higher profits. But the firm has also incomplete information 
about industry-wide constraint to the availability of fixed 
capital loans. Hence in order to estimate p the firm takes into 
account a from which it can infer about industry wide shock 
to the availability of fixed capital loans. If however p — the 
correlation between two industry-wide shocks is zero a is not 
affected by (3 and then H = 0. On the other hand when p is positive 
(negative) P affects a direcUy (inversely) and then H is negative 
(positive). It may also be noted that p determines the value of 
J, though for J it can't determine the sign which is unequivocally 
negative. 
Substituting for G. H and J the second period optimal price 
becomes 
p = Z/b - m "M k + (m - b) (i/b) k J + 
m- 1 ( (m - b) H a + { ( m - b) J - e } p ] (23) 
Taking expectation across firms average price becomes 
p = Z / b - k / b + m" 1 [ (m-b ) Hd + 
{ (m - b) J - 9} s). (24) 
In this case individual firm and average industry outputs 
(given k and k ) are respectively 
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q(l = 6(1 o+ P) + k a n d 
qd = 0 (1 o + s) + k• _ l 2 6 ) 
In this case also optimal profit function, n (k. k, a, p. d. s) 
shows same properties as in the earlier case, viz. 5fl ( . ) / 5k > 0 
and 8n ( . )/ 5k < 0. 
In the first period the firm decides about optimal choice ot 
k by solving the program (PI). In this case k is not constrained 
by a. The firm has imperfect information about average capital 
stock k as also about d and s. As in second period it is assumed 
that the firm forms expectations about k, d, s rationally 
based on the information setQ. Specifically, k. d, s are assumed 
to be jointly normally distributed with mean vector ( e j k/ Q), 
e (d/fi ), e ( s/a ) ) and variance-covariance matrix V(k. d, s/Q) 
where e (k/Q), e (d/Q) and e (_s/Q) are respectively,_the linear 
least squares regressions of k, d and s on Q and V( k, d, s/Q ) 
is their error variance-covariance matrix. Now I consider the 
program ( PI) which in this case is 
Max E { r d. s 11 R ' " 1 { exp ( p + qd ) - exp ( r+1 o + P)1 " exp (0) 
k 
From above the following optimal investment formula is 
derived from the first order condition of optimality 9 : 
k = mZ* - (m - b) (1/b) e (k/H) - (m - b) (m - 1) Ha + 
(m - b) 2 e ( d/£2) - { (m - b) J- 0 } (m - 1) p + 
{ (m - b)J- 0} (m - b) e (s/D) (27) 
where Z* = log (1- 1 /m) - 2R - R - Z (b - l)/b + F*'V (k, d, s/a) F, 
R = In (R*) and Ft = ( - (m - b)/mb, (m - b)2 H/m, 
{ (m - b)J- 0} ( m - b) /m ) and t denotes transpose. 
All of e (k/n), e (d/Q) and e (s/£2) are based on information 
a and p. Thus average investment k is solely dependent on the 
averages of a and p, i.e. d and s. Hence I assume 
k = |i0+ + ^ s 
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Taking expectations conditional on ft, 
e (k/n ) = Mo + Mie(d/n) + M2e(s/ft) 
i.e. e(k/^)= |io+(mAi+M2Bi)a + (|ii A2 + M2B2) P- (28) 
Substituting for e(K/fl) from (28) in (27) and averaging over 
firms, 
k = mZ* + (m - b ) ( l - m)Hd + {(m - b)J- 0}(1- m)s - (m - b) 
(l/b){ Mo+ Mie(d/n) + |i2e(s/ft)} + (m - b)2 He (d/Q) + 
{(m - b)J - 6}(m - b)e(s/H) 
Taking expectations with respect to information set and 
substituting for e (d/Q) and e(s/Q), 
e = mZ* - (m - b)(l/b) \xQ + [(m - b ) ( l - b)H-
(m - b)(l/b) MiKAia + A2 p) + [{(m - b) J- 0} 
(1-b) - (m - b) ( l/b)] (Bia+B2p). 
Equating coefficients from (28), 
Mo = mZ* - (m - b)(l/b) [iQ, 
MiAi+ m2Bi = [(m - b)(l- b)H - (m - b ) ( l - b) MilAi + 
[{(m - b) J - 0}( 1— b) - (m - b)(l/b) p2]Bi, 
jj.jA2 + |i2B2 = Km - b ) ( l - b)H - (m - b ) ( l - b) P-iJAi 
+ [{(m - b) J- 0}(1- b) - (m - b)(l/b) p2] Bi. 
Solving the above system of equations, 
Ho = bZ*. 
H, = (1- b) ( m - b ) b (1/m) H, 
H2 = (1- b) b (1/m) { (m - b) J - 0}. 
Now optimal investment for the typical firm is given by k = bZ* + Q i « + Q 2 p ( 2 9 ) 
Where q = m " b [ m (l _ m )m + (m - b) (m - 1 + b)AilH + 
m 
ELzJ-1^ B i l ( m - b ) J - 0 ] 
m 
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and Q2 = — — — 2 (m - 1 + b)A2H + -1 [(1 - m)m + 
m m 
(m - b)(m - 1 + b)B2lf(m - b)J - 9] 
Average investment in Case II is 
k = bZ* + Qid + Q2 S (30) 
Putting for k and k in (23), (24), (25) and (26) the second 
period optimal values for firm and average industry prices and 
outputs are found to be 
p = ZzJ2?*+ 1 [ (m - b)H - Qil a + l [ ( m - b) 
b m m 
J - e - M P - ^ O i d - ^ t e (3D mb mb 
_ Z - bZ* i 1 
p = — — + — [ b (m - b)H - mQiI d + — 
b mb mb 
[b(m - b)J - b0 - mQ2] s (32) 
qd = eio + bz * + Q l t t + (Q2 + 9) (3 (33) 
qd = 910 + bZ * +Qid + (Q2 + 9) s (34) 
As in Case I, here also the complete information counterpart 
of price and output are solved by setting e • (p/H) = p, 
e (k/Q) = k, V (p/£>) = 0 and V (k/£3) = 0. Industry wide ^yerag'e 
price, output and investment are found to be respectively, 
m 1 
p* = - e i o - In _ _ +2R + R - 9 S (32') 
m 
_ ,, , m - 1 
q = bie0 + In 2R - R] + b9s (34'J m ' 
r* m - 1 
k = ( b -1 ) 91 + b In 2bR - bR + (b - l)9s (30') 
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A comparison with the corresponding co-efficients show that 
unconditional expectations of p. q and k under incomplete 
information are greater for p, k and less for q than that of the 
same under complete information. Under complete information 
co-efficients of d in both the average price and investment 
equations are zero. In the incomplete information case 
co-efficients of d in the average price, output and investment 
equations are zero whenever either of (a) rp— > 0 or (b) ra — > 0 
and p = 0 .The co-efficients of s in average price, output and 
investment equations under complete and incomplete 
information generally differ. These differences in respect of 
complete information vis-a-vis its incomplete information 
counterpart arise due to the effect of incomplete information 
about average price and investment on a typical firm's decision 
making process in the two periods. 
Case m 
In the rest of this section I will consider Case III whence the 
typical firm is constrained by the availability of credit in both 
the periods. In this Case I will not derive the pricing as well as 
investment formulae. These can veiy easily be had from the 
previous two cases — equations (23) and (16) respectively. 
Substituting for k from (16) and k from (17) in (23) the optimal 
price is found to be 
p = (Z - k0) /b + — [ ( m b) H - 1] a + 
l m _ i 
-H(m - b) J - 9] (3- — - d (35) 
m mb 
Taking expectation across firms average price becomes 
p = (Z - ko)/b + — [b(m - b)H - m]d + 
mb 
I [(m - b)J - 0]s (36) 
m 
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The individual firm and average industry outputs alter 
substituting for k and k are respectively 
qd = (01o + kG) + 0(3 + a and (37) 
qd = 0(lo + k0) + 0s + d (38) 
In the same way as in the other two cases, the incomplete 
information values for average price and quantity are found 
to be 
p* = - (01o + k0)/b - - I d - —s (36') 
_ b b 
qd* = (01o +k0 ) + d + 0s (38') 
Though the average output is same as in the case of 
complete information, average price under incomplete 
information differs from its complete information counterpart. 
The reason that the incomplete information price differs from 
its complete information counterpart is same as in Case II. 
However for average output and average investment the complete 
and incomplete information values are same because of the fact 
that the typical firm's output and investment being constrained 
by the availabilities of working and fixed capital loans, incomplete 
information has no role to play in the firm's decision making 
process as far as output and investment are concerned. 
Section in 
In this section I will consider the effects of different types 
of disturbances to the availabilities of credit on the average 
price and quantity variables. The disturbances may arise for 
both types of credit. It may be uniform in the industry or may 
vary considerably among firms. One thing should also be borne 
in mind that the results largely depends upon the correlation 
between two types of credit, p. The effects of the disturbance to 
22 
allocation of credit will depend upon the specific case under 
consideration. 1 will give the results for each case under 
different assumptions about the disturbances. For the sake of 
convenience, the co-efficients for d and s in the average price 
and quantity equations will henceforth be denoted by <fd> ^s » 
<|)(1 , and <{>q, respectively. 
One thing should be noted at the veiy outset that in Case 
I, d)15, <{)P , (J)^  . and tip . do not depend upon ra, rg, rm, p and m. 
d s d s 
As a result different types of shocks as also a change in m have 
no effect on these co-efficients. The industrywide shocks d and 
s have same effects on average price and output as discussed 
earlier. 
Uniform disturbances to working capital credit 
Uniform disturbances to working capital credit implies 
rp =ow/os-» 0. Other parameters are held constant. Case I gives 
same results as in the general discussion about the effects of 
d and s on average price and output. Now I consider the other 
cases. When rp->0, it can be shown that H-+0. whatever may be 
(m - b) (1- p2) + m[r^+ (1- p2)l 
p and J-* - 0 
b 2 [ r j + ( l - p 2 ) ] 
Then in the average price equation (32), —»- 0 and 
p e (m - b) (2m - b) (1- p2) + [m (m - b) + b2] r^ 
(t)K-»- T < 0. 
s mb (r + 1-p2 ) 
a r 
In the average output equation (34), ^ -»• 0 and -
- 0m + °_fb " 1} Km - b) ((m - b) (1- p2) +m (r£+l- p2)} 
b ( r ^ + 1 - p 2 ) 
+ b2(r2 + l -p 2 ) ] > 0. 
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These are expected results. For the otherwise symmetric 
firms constrained by the availability of working capital credit a 
uniform disturbance to working capital credit means an increase 
in s results in an increase in (3 on an average. It results in an 
increase in output, and a decrease in the individual optimal 
price directly for it relaxes the working capital loans constraint 
and indirectly through a decrease in the individual estimate of 
the average price. The individual estimate of the average price 
in this case doesn't depend upon a, because a uniform shock 
to working capital credit implies that industry wide shock is 
same as that of the firm. So the typical firm doesn't expect other 
firms to raise investment in fixed capital subject to the 
availabilities of loans for this purpose. 
In Case III. in the average price formula (36) 
3 1 ^ ^ P 9 
^ d ^ " F a n d < } ) s " m 
( m - b ) ( l - p2) + m (r^+ l-p2) 
Km - b) £ + I], 
b2 (r^ + l-p2) 
both being negative. In the average output equation (38). 
())[j -> 1 and -> 0, both being positive. The typical firm being 
constrained by the availabilities of credit for both types of 
credit increases in d and s will reduce average price and 
increase average output. The effect of a change in d is same as 
in the complete information case as was mentioned earlier. The 
effect of a change in s on average .price operates both directly 
and indirectly in a similar fashion as in Case II. 
Uniform disturbances to credit for fixed capital 
Uniform disturbances to credit for investment implies that 
ra = ou / ad -»• 0 with other parameters held constant. In Case 
II. the average price equation (32) shows that 
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n —0prmrR 2 6 - ^ [b2 [m (m - b) m - 1+ b] (r + 1- p2) + 
nib3 (r n +1- D2) 13 P (m - 1+ b) (m - b) (2m - b) (1- p2)] 
a n d ^ [(m - b) (2m - b) (1 - p2) + b2 
mb3 ( r j +l-p2 ) ( rp) 
(rj> +1- p2)] [[m(m - 1) + b] rj* + b2 ( l - p2)] 
In the average output equation, 
_ (m - b) Gprmr \ 
<t>3-* - [b (m - b + b2) ( r j +1- p2) + (m - 1 + b) 
d mb2 (r2 + l -p 2 ) 2 P 
P (2m - b) (1 — p2)] 
and <t>s T Km - b) (2m - b) (1 - p2) + b2 
mb2 (rp+l-p2 )2 (r2 + i _ p 2 ) ] + e 
P 
The restrictions on the parameters show that <(>s is 
unequivocally negative while depend very much on p. The 
co-efficient of d ^ 0 according as p 0. In general a-non-zero 
<j»^ in this case vis-a-vis its counterpart in case of a uniform 
disturbance to working capital credit occurs due to the fact that 
a non-uniform disturbance to working capital credit implies 
that a also enters the estimate of the price for a typical firm if 
p As a result it also appears in the average industry price. 
But when p = 0, then as the repercussion of the binding 
constraint on working capital credit does not operate, it cannot 
affect optimal investment and hence, does not affect the average 
industry price. 




In Case III. the average price equation (36) shows*that 
(j)[j > — [(m - b) 0prmrjj + mb (r« + 1 - p2)] 
nib (r 3+ 1 - p2) _ — 0 
and4s "" 9 [(m - b) (2m - b) (1 - p2) + b2 
mb2 (rf + 1 - p2) 2 i 9m P + 1 - p2)] 
For average output = 1 and = 0. In this case one also finds 
that the coefficient of <|)P is not unequivocal. If p is non-
negative (p > 0) then the coefficient is negative while a strictly 
negative p makes the co-efficient indeterminate in sign. This is 
because of the fact that in contrast to Case II, in this case there 
are two effects of a change in d, one operates directly when all 
firms in the industry are fixed capital loans constrained and 
indirectly as the firms are also working capital loans 
constrained and operates through the estimate of average price 
if p is non-zero. The negative sign of s is as expected as in earlier 
cases. But on average output loosening of both the constraints 
has positive effect. 
Uniform disturbances to both types of credit 
Uniform disturbances to both types of credit implies that 
ra -> 0 as well as rp 0 with other parameters held constant. 
In Case II, in the average price equation <})P -*• 0 and that of 
d>P -> ^ [(m - b) (2m - b) + b2 ] < 0. For average output <0 0 
s _mb p. a 
and (Jfl -*• [ ( m - b ) ( b - l ) ( 2 m - b + b2) + bm] > 0. The effects 
s mb 
on average price and output are unequivocal and as expected. 
In Case III, in the average price equation ({>P -*• - (1/b) <0 and 
" - 0 (m - b) (2m - b) n . .. „ • • p < 0. In the average output equation rs 
<t> j 1 a n d <l>g 0, both being positive. These are also expected 
results. 
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Change in the competitiveness of the industry 
An increase in the competitiveness of the industry means 
an increase in m. Then I will consider the effects on the average 
price and output under different types of disturbances. First 
I will consider the case when disturbance to working capital 
credit is uniform. The result will differ in each case listed 
earlier. 
In Case II, it can be shown that when disturbance to working 
capital credit is uniform, then for the average price "p p ^ 
equation = 0 and = 5 
5m m2b(r 2+ 1 - p2) 
[(3m2— b2) r2+ 2 (m 2 - b2) (1 - p 2)] < 0. For the average 
output equation —— = 0 and 
5m 
= [(3m2 - b2) r 2+ 2 (m2 - b2) (1 - p 2)] > 0. 
5 m m2b(r„+ 1 - p2) a p 
In case III, for the average price equation ^ = 0 and 
_ 6m 
= f(3m2 - b2) r ^  + 2 (m2 - b2) (1 - p 2)]. 
^ m 2 b ( r 2 + l - p 2 ) _ q 
For the average output equation, 
= 0 and _ = 0. 
5m 6m 
When the disturbance to availability of fixed capital is 
uniform implying ra —>0, then it can-be shown that in Case II, 
, . .. 6(J)d " 9prmr I for the average pnce equation, = * ^ 
5m m2b3 (r£+ 1 - p2) 
[[b2(m2 - b +1) + b (2m - b) (m - 1 + b) + m (m - b) 
(4m - 2 + b)] (1 - p2) + b2 rp ] — 0 according as p — 0. and 
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5d>p - e o 0 
• s [ { 2 (m2 - b2 ) [ m (m - 1) + b] 
8m mb3 (r2+ 1 - p2)2 a 
+ m (2m - 1) (m - b) (2m - b) + b2 [m2 - m + m2 - b2]} rjj 
(1- p2 ) + b2 A + 2b2 (m2 - b2) (1 - p2)2] < 0. 
P "q a 2 
For the average output equation — = m2b2 ( r 2 + t _ p2)2 
[b [m (m - b) + b2 (m - b + 1)] (rjj + 1 - p2) + [b (m - b) 
(m - 1+ b) + m (2m - b) (2m - 1)] (1 - p2) ] < 0 
q" 
and = 2. , . ° . r r - [2 ( m 2 - b2) + b] (1 - p2) + 5m m2b2 (r z+ 1 - p2)2 
(m 2 - b 2 ) r 2 ] >0 
In Case III, for the average price equation, 
o p « 2 
5(t>d 0PrmrP > > 
= 2 —0 according as p —0 and 
5m m2b (r a+ 1 - p2) 
"p Q 
- i ^ - = ^ [b2 r « - 2 (m2 - b2) (1 - p2)] , the 
5m m2b2 (r„ + 1 - p2) P 
sign of which depends upon p — when absolute value of p is 
54>P 
unity - — is positive while any other value of p makes it 
5m 
indeterminate in sign. For the average output equation 
50? 5 ^ 
= 0 and —£ = 0. 
5m 5m 
Lastly I will consider the case when the disturbances to 
the availabilities of both types of credit are uniform implying 
ra - » 0 and rp 0. In Case II, for the average price equation, 
28 
S<t>P 5<|>s - 20 
E = 0 and - — = (m2 - b2) <,0. For the average 
5m 5m_ m2b 
5<t>S dip 9 
output equation — ^ = 0 and — - = [ b (b - l ) 
5m 5m m2b 
( 2m2 - b + b2 ) + 2m ( m - b ) ( b - 1 ) | > 0. In Case III for the 
5<{? _ e (4m - 3b) 
average price equation, - — = 0 and = — < 0. 
Stfj m 5 ^ 
For the average output equation, —— = 0 and = 0. 
5m 5m 
The negative effects of an increase in m on <j) can be 
explained in the following way. When individual firms respond 
to shocks to working capital loans constraint average price is 
also responsive to the corresponding industiy wide shock. But 
the firms have only imperfect information about industry wide 
conditions, most firms fail to predict the actual average price 
correctly, though in a rational expectations equilibrium on an 
average they predict the average price correctly. As the degree 
of competition increases, a higher than average price will 
reduce sales volume. So the firms will suffer loss. Thus with 
increased competition the firms in the industry will expect 
other firms to respond less to shocks. Accordingly the effect on 
output is higher. This is true for all firms in the industiy, hence 
for the industry average price and output. With rp 0, or 
p = 0, the indirect effect of a on the estimate of p doesn't work 
in Case II for the reasons already discussed and this is 
independent of the degree of competition prevailing in the 
industiy. Thus co-efficient of a in price or output equations is 
zero. Thus <j)P , <j) ^ have no effect on average price and output. 
But when ra 0 the indirect effect operating through 
estimate of "p is non-zero and hence <(g , <1>JJ is negative 
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> W 
(positive) according as p is positive (negative). The explanations 
of the effects of a change in m on the co-efficients are same in 
Case III. 
Section IV 
In this concluding section I will give a brief summary of the 
main results of this paper. It has been shown in Section II that 
in a setting of monopolistic competition incomplete information 
about the industry wide shock to the availability of working 
capital loans will make the average price (in an unconditional 
expectation sense) higher than if there is complete information. 
In general, the effects of the industry wide shocks to the 
availabilities of loans for fixed and working capital loans on 
average price will differ in the presence of incomplete information. 
The same holds good if a typical firm and hence the industry as 
a whole is constrained by the availabilities of both fixed and 
working capital loans. If, however a typical firm (and hence the 
industry as a whole) is constrained by the availability of the 
fixed capital loans the unconditional expectation of average 
price as well as the effects of the shocks to the availabilities of 
fixed and working capital loans on the average price and 
output are same with or without complete information. Then 
I have shown that in a situation of incomplete information the 
effects of stochastic shocks to the availabilities of two types of 
loans on individual and average price and quantity depend on 
the properties of the stochastic disturbances — whether the 
shocks are uniform or not, whether the shocks are correlated 
or not etc. 
In Section III, I have considered the effects of a change in 
the competitiveness of the industry on average price and 
output. It has been shown that because of the presence of 
forecast error in average price, increased competition leads to 
decreased sensitivity of stochastic shocks to average price. 
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Notes 
'Williamson (1987) provides a very good survey of the literature 
on financial intermediaries and economic activity. 
2There is however a sizeable microeconomic literature on 
investment in duopolistic or oligopolistic literature, e.g. 
Brander and Spencer (1983) and Okuno-Fujiwara and 
Suzumura (1987). 
3Such a demand function can be obtained if the utility function 
is assumed to be CES. For derivation see Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki (1987), Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Nishimura 
(1992). 
4It is also the logarithm of the optimal profit function. 
5The second order condition of optimality requires that 
0 < m/(m - 1). 
6Vp—for short. 
7 For detailed derivation see Sargent (1987). 
8Taking partial derivatives of rc ( . ) w. r. t. k and k, 
sn ( . ) m - 1 _ 
= > 0 
5k 6 [m + 9 (1 - m)J 
and < 0 
6k [m + 9 (1 -m)]|b + 9 (1 - b) 
as m > b > 0 by assumption and 9 < m/ (m - 1) by the second 
order condition. 
9 It can be shown that the second order condition of optimality 
in this case requires that - (1/m) be negative, which is 
automatically satisfied because of the restriction on m. 
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